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14 October 1960

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

14 October 1960

### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

USSR: A Soviet party central committee meeting has been called for 14 October, according to the Polish Embassy counselor in Washington. Khrushchev is expected to arrive back in Moscow late that afternoon. In any event, some high-level party meeting is almost certain to take place following his return to Moscow, presumably to consider events at the UN and to discuss tactics toward China at the forthcoming bloc meeting in November. The disturbing situation in agriculture might also be brought up.

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#### II. ASIA-AFRICA

\*Iran-USSR: Iran may send a good-will mission to the Soviet Union in the near future to discuss economic relations between the two countries. However, in discussions with US

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[redacted] and British officials, the Shah and other Iranian officials insist that no political agreements or statements will be made.

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[redacted] The Shah has been anxious to make some gesture to placate the USSR without endangering his CENTO position or the Iranian-US bilateral treaty. Continued efforts by the Soviet Union to obtain political concessions from Iran will probably be largely unsuccessful as long as the Shah retains his confidence in Western support.

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UAR: [redacted] Nasir

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[redacted] intended to go to Syria either that night or the following morning to attend to a "serious crisis in the Syrian cabinet revolving around Sarraj." The cabinet frictions which led to the shake-up of 20 September, in which Interior Minister Sarraj seemed to gain strength by his appointment as cabinet chairman, apparently have not ended. Nasir now may be faced again with the problem of risking continued dissension by defending the unpopular Sarraj, on whom he depends for the strict control of internal security in Syria.

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[redacted] Libya: Opposition pressures have built up further as a result of parliamentary assaults on corruption in Prime Minister Kubar's government. If, in the face of this opposition, King Idris persists in retaining Kubar and other ministers, a situation threatening the monarchy itself may develop. The normally supine Libyan lower house has voted overwhelmingly to demand cancellation of the contract for construction of the Fezzan road--a major economic development project--and to have scandals investigated by a parliamentary committee. A vote of no confidence, which has the backing of a majority of the lower house, is to be debated on 18 October.

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Laos: The Souvanna Phouma cabinet decided on 12 October to move the government to Luang Prabang, reportedly within the next ten days. The cabinet also reportedly determined that Laos would seek a loan from the USSR if the United States did not give aid for the armed forces and the police. Soviet Ambassador-designate Abramov arrived in Vientiane on 13 October as scheduled. 61<

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Japan: The Ikeda government is re-examining its relationship with the neutral Afro-Asian nations to avoid being isolated from them. The Japanese press is stressing the growing prominence of the Asian-African bloc in the United

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Nations as a third force which offers Japan a positive alternative for independence from both the Soviet and the United States power blocs. The press is urging that Japanese diplomacy be more independent and that it adopt what the press terms a more "realistic" position on the admission of Communist China to the UN. [REDACTED]

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### III. THE WEST

France: [REDACTED] Rising tensions in France over the continuing stalemate on Algeria are encouraging extreme rightists to plan for early action against the Fifth Republic. [REDACTED]

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Ex-Premier Pinay, whom some of the plotters hope to make De Gaulle's successor, is playing down the likelihood of a military seizure of power, but has warned US officials that the political situation is deteriorating rapidly. [REDACTED]

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\*Argentine Situation: President Frondizi has not yet fully resolved the crisis sparked on 11 October by an army demand that he change some of his advisers and policies. The crisis was eased on 12 October by his radio appeal for public support of constitutional government and by subsequent military communiqués endorsing constitutional procedures, but some difficulties may arise from negotiations over the army demands and from probable shifts in some army commands. Army Commander in Chief General Carlos Toranzo Montero, probably the army's most influential general, retains his post, [REDACTED]

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but, [redacted] he was excluded from a meeting of army chiefs on the evening of 12 October, and Toranzo considers this tantamount to being relieved of command.

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#### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Nato Country Reactions to Certain Forms of US Nuclear Assistance, viz, Aid to the French Nuclear Weapons Program Through Transfer of Information and Materials, or Outright Transfer to France of US Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Systems, or US Support for Creation of a Multilateral NATO Nuclear Capability. SNIE 20-2-60. 11 October 1960. [redacted]

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Soviet Central Committee Reported Ready to Convene

A Soviet party central committee meeting has been called for 14 October, according to the counselor of the Polish Embassy in Washington. A meeting of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet, originally scheduled for 18 October, was postponed until the 25th, possibly to permit scheduling of a party gathering. Khrushchev is expected to arrive home late in the afternoon of 14 October, leaving him very little time for consultations if a meeting convenes on that date. In any case, a high-level party conclave is almost certain to take place following his return to Moscow.

The urgent problem presented by the further deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations over the past month while Khrushchev was in New York would appear to be a necessary subject for review soon after his return. [ ] a preparatory committee for the forthcoming world Communist meeting to be held during the November anniversary celebration will convene this month. Hungarian party chief Kadar is apparently returning to Moscow with Khrushchev, suggesting that he will participate in preparing a position on intra-bloc problems.

A great deal of other unfinished business awaits Khrushchev's return. He has been outside the USSR since 9 September and away from Moscow for almost two thirds of 1960. The disturbing situation in agriculture, for instance, is another likely subject for discussion.

There is no indication how Khrushchev's New York venture is being interpreted among his presidium colleagues; his personal conduct of foreign policy might be subject to some criticism. Soviet press coverage of his trip, however, has portrayed him as the single most outstanding world leader today and an "indefatigable fighter for peace." [ ]

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Further Pressure in Libyan Parliament for Removal  
Of Kubar Government

Public and parliamentary opposition to the Kubar government in Libya has sharply increased following the exposure of flagrant corruption among high-level officials. Indignation has focused on a new facet of the scandal connected with government financing of the Fezzan road project--a scandal in which Prime Minister Kubar is implicated, along with Abdullah Abid, a member of the ruling Senussi family. This affair caused sharp criticism in the press last month, and a majority of the members of Parliament signed a petition requesting King Idris to call an extraordinary session.

The King, who in July had sent a letter to government officials calling for action to stamp out corruption, ordered Parliament to reconvene on 3 October. Shortly before the session began he replaced four cabinet ministers but retained Kubar and others involved in the scandals. After two preliminary meetings, the House of Deputies on 10 October voted overwhelmingly in favor of a resolution demanding cancellation of the road contract and calling for a full investigation by a parliamentary committee. A majority of house members also backed a resolution for a vote of no confidence in the Kubar government. In line with constitutional provisions, this is to be debated in a subsequent session scheduled for 18 October.

If the King ignores Parliament or orders it dissolved and continues support of Kubar, he will risk a further build-up of antigovernment pressures endangering the monarchy itself. While Libyan security forces appear capable of controlling any immediate antigovernment moves or demonstrations, an issue has been created in which a number of diverse groups may be able to find common ground for an eventual attempt to overthrow the regime.

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The Situation in Laos

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Premier Souvanna Phouma and his ministers, at a cabinet meeting on 12 October, decided to move the government from Vientiane to the royal capital at Luang Prabang. Minister of Finance Inpeng was instructed to make the necessary arrangements for the move, expected to be completed within ten days. He was also instructed to arrange for the transfer of funds in the National Bank to Luang Prabang. Various Lao leaders in Vientiane have been considering such a move for some time as a means of getting out from under the immediate influence of Captain Kong Le, of drawing the King into more active participation in government deliberations, and of providing General Phoumi with a face-saving alternative to Vientiane should he decide to drop his opposition to the government.

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At the same meeting, the cabinet reportedly also determined that it would seek a loan from the USSR if the United States failed to give aid for the armed forces and the police. Soviet Ambassador-designate Abramov arrived in Vientiane on 13 October as scheduled. According to the press, his arrival was the occasion for an airdrop demonstration by Kong Le's 2nd Paratroop Battalion.

The Thai acting foreign minister's announcement in Bangkok that the Thai Embassy has been instructed to evacuate all Thai nationals from Laos as soon as possible is likely to lead to additional tension with the Souvanna government. Premised on the assertions that the situation was worsening and that civil war was inevitable, Bangkok's action will probably be construed by Souvanna as another effort to discredit his regime. Implementation of the evacuation order will probably be limited largely to Thai nationals in Vientiane; neither government is believed to have accurate information on the location of Thais in other parts of Laos.

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reports the existence of scattered opposition by district chiefs to the Pathet Lao there. Resistance to the Pathet Lao is probably still largely unorganized, however, and the Pathet Lao appear to exercise firm control over Sam Neua town and Muong Peun to the Southwest. Meanwhile, the Laotian Army has reportedly launched a counter-offensive to regain territory lost to the Pathet Lao in southeastern Phong Saly Province.

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Neutralist Sentiment Gaining Strength in Japan

The Ikeda government is re-examining its relationships with the Afro-Asian nations. The Japanese press is stressing that Tokyo has unrealistically supported the US in the current session of the UN General Assembly and risks being isolated from the growing third-force movement as represented by the Afro-Asian bloc. Publications are asserting that a substantial third force is emerging, citing as evidence the increase of the Afro-Asian bloc from 29 to 46 members in the UN and the resolution sponsored by five neutral nations calling for direct negotiations between President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev.

Newspapers state that on the issue of war and peace, nations which do not belong to the Western or Communist camps need no longer accept "the fate forced on them by the big two." Editorials are urging that Japan's future diplomacy, inside and outside the UN, be more independent and that particularly on the question of Communist China's admission to the UN, Japan adopt a "realistic" position.

At the same time, the Japanese Socialists have hailed the British Labor party conference's call for a renunciation of nuclear weapons and its criticism of NATO as strengthening their own neutralist policy. These developments have given new respectability to the Socialists' neutralist doctrine as they prepare for elections to the lower house of the Diet next month.

Japanese neutralist sentiment already is believed to have gained considerable ground as a result of the crisis surrounding ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty earlier this year. Undoubtedly, a large measure of Japanese "neutralist" sentiment stems from a noticeable revival of national pride, which is chafing from alleged "subservience" to the US.

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Rightist Plotting Against De Gaulle

Rising apprehensions in France over the continuing stalemate on Algeria are encouraging extreme rightists to plan for early action against the Fifth Republic. French public opinion on Algeria is becoming increasingly polarized between leftists, who are pressing De Gaulle to negotiate with the Algerian rebels, and rightists, who are determined to keep Algeria French. Both the elements are angered by De Gaulle's refusal to abandon his policy of self-determination for Algeria, and general opposition to some of his major economic and foreign policies is mounting.

police and administrative centers in Paris are so located and staffed that a take-over would be possible with relatively small effort, if skillfully timed and coordinated.

Ex-Premier Antoine Pinay, ousted as finance minister by De Gaulle in January and regarded by some plotters as the possible head of a successor regime, is playing down the likelihood of a military seizure of power. However, he has warned US officials that France has reached an impasse over Algeria and that the political situation in France has "deteriorated rapidly."

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